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ABSTRAK 
Peranan amalan pengurusan risiko dari sudut pandangan firma pelangan terhadap 
kejayaan projek perisian yang dilaksanakan secara pembangunan tempah daripada 
pihak ke tiga. 
Fenomena pembangunan tempah daripada pihak ke tiga dalam bidang Teknologi Maklumat 
(TM) sedang mengalami tahap kematangan sejak beberapa tahun kebelakangan ini. Banyak 
organisasi telah mempertimbangkan untuk melakukan pembangunan tempah daripada 
pembekal pihak ke tiga bagi memenuhi keperluan fungsi TM seperti aktiviti pembangunan 
perisian. Walau bagaimanapun kejayaan aktiviti pembangunan tempah tidak dapat dijamin. Ia 
memerlukan suatu tahap amalan pengurusan risiko dilaksanakan untuk memantau dan 
mengawal risiko yang berkaitan dengan aktiviti-aktiviti pembangunan tempah. Kajian ini 
dilaksanakan untuk mengetahui peranan amalan pengurusan risiko dalam menentukan 
kejayaan aktiviti pembangunan tempah. Borang soal selidik berstuktur digunakan dalam 
kajian ini. Ia diedarkan kepada 200 pekeija di firma pelanggan. Data yang dikumpulkan telah 
diuji melalui kaedah statistik. Keputusan kajian menunjukkan bahawa hubungan diantara 
persekitaran untuk projek pembangunan tempah dan kejayaan projek pembangunan perisian 
dengan kaedah pembangunan tempah menjadi lebih kukuh apabila amalan pengurusan risiko 
adalah tinggi. 
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ABSTRACT 
The Information Technology (IT) outsourcing phenomenon had been maturing in recent 
years. Many organizations considered to outsource their IT functions such as software 
development activities to a third party vendor. However the success of such outsourcing 
decisions will not be guaranteed. It required some level of risk management practices to be in 
place to monitor and control the risk associated with outsourcing activities. This study was 
conducted to find out the role of risk management practices in ensuring the success of the 
outsourcing activities. Structured questionnaire was used in this study. It was distributed to 
200 employees of the client firms. The data collected was statistically analyzed. The results 
showed that the relationship between nature of software outsourcing and the success of the 
software outsourcing project become stronger when the risk management practices is high. 
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Chapter 1 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background 
Software outsourcing had been a common phenomenon in Information Technology (IT) 
industry. In typical software outsourcing projects, the firm that is requesting the service is 
called as client firm. Meanwhile the firm which provides the service is referred to as vendor 
firm. The client firm outsourced their software development function to a third party vendor 
to achieve cost efficiency and remain competitive in current business environment. Some of 
the benefits the firms try to achieve by outsourcing are reduction in operation cost, system 
quality improvement, allowing the firm to focus on its core competencies, explore new 
technologies and focus on value added activities. (Oh, Gallivan & Kim, 2006). However 
regardless of the various benefits of software outsourcing, the .firm always faces the risk 
associated to the outsourcing activities. 
The risk ofthe software outsourcing projects is related to certain behaviors of the vendor firm. 
Some examples of such behaviors are shirking, poaching and opportunistic renegotiation 
(Aron, Clemons & Reddi, 2005). The undesired behavior of the vendor firm will lead to 
failure of the software outsourcing projects. Analysis had been done to identifY the reasons for 
such failures. The researchers found that the activities that had been outsourced may fall into 
the core competency of the firm. If such activities were outsourced, then the firm may lose its 
control to the vendor. The vendor may take the opportunity to gain control over the client 
firm. The outsource contract may end up in lock in situation (Oh, Gallivan & Kim, 2006). In 
order to avoid such undesired situation, the outsourcing activities and its associated risk must 
be managed properly by the client firm. A well defined risk management practices must be in 
place to monitor and mitigate the risk. 
1.2 Problem Statement 
Many firms consider software outsourcing as a strategic move for the firm to remain 
competitive in the industry. This had been a driving force for the firm to take impulsive 
decision to engage in the outsourcing activities. Even though many outsourcing decision 
achieved the intended results, but there are some cases that software outsourcing projects are 
not successful. An example of successful outsourcing projects are referring to the case of 
British Petroleum (BP) outsourcing its IT functions (Aubert, Patry, Rivard, & Smith, 2000). 
In Malaysian context, global firms such as Nokia and Hewlett Packard had been successfully 
outsourced their call center operation to Malaysian own company Scicom (Frost & Sullivan, 
2005). Meanwhile the case of failure was shown by the outsourcing projects performed by 
banking industry in Malaysia. The bank which carried out the outsourcing projects faced 
resistance to change from employees and also decline in service quality for the outsourced 
services (Suhaimi, Mustaffa, & Hussin, 2005). 
These outcomes raised a question why some software outsourcing projects are successful 
meanwhile some are not successful. The software outsourcing projects are not successful 
because there are risks associated to the project. Further analysis into why risk existed in 
software outsourcing projects lead the researchers to look into the nature of the software 
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outsourcing project. The nature of the software outsourcing projects can be further 
categorized into vendor competency, degree of outsourcing, contract duration and 
relationship. Each elements of the nature of software outsourcing contributes to success or 
failure of the projects. Further analysis on each elements of the nature of software outsourcing 
projects will be described in Chapter 2. 
Meanwhile some of the software outsourcing projects was successful because the firm 
engaged in outsourcing activities performs risk management practices. The risk management 
practices were able to mitigate the risk associated to the nature of software outsourcing 
projects. 
Thus, the problem is to find out empirically if the risk management practices play 
moderating role in the relationship between nature of software outsourcing and the 
success of the software outsourcing project. The finding will help the client firm to 
strategize their software outsourcing projects. The firm need to analyze the type of task 
intended to be outsourced and the risk related to it before the decision for outsourcing is 
made. Aubert, Rivard and Patry (1996) (as cited in Aubert, Patry & Rivard, 2005) suggested 
that not all type of task is suitable for outsourcing. Some types of task should be kept in house 
rather than outsourced to a third party vendor. The task suitable for outsourcing should have 
lower risk compared to the one performed in house. 
However, in current situation the client firm need to engage a vendor firm to support more 
critical IT functions such as software application development. In this case the risk of failure 
is higher but if the software outsourcing projects can be completed successfully, the client 
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firm is able to achieve higher return in terms of cost saving and strategic capability. The risk 
management practices are perceived to be helpful to mitigate the risk and increase the chances 
for the software outsourcing projects to be more successful. These are the motivation that 
drives the study to find out the role of risk management practices in the relationship between 
nature of the software outsourcing and the success of the project. 
1.3 Research Objective 
The objective of this study is to investigate empirically the role of risk management practices 
as a moderator in the relationship between nature of software outsourcing projects and the 
success of the projects. 
1.4 Research Questions 
The decision to outsource a software project to a third party vendor firm is associated with a 
number of risks. The risk exposure level is depending on the nature of the software 
outsourcing project (vendor competency, degree of outsourcing, contract duration and 
relationship). When the vendor has higher competency level then the risk of failure is lower. 
For degree of outsourcing, when more complex activities have been outsourced, then the risk 
of failure is higher. When the contract duration is longer, there is possibility that the vendor 
behaves opportunistically and possesses higher risk of failure. Finally when the client firm 
and the vendor firm have good relationship, then the risk of failure is lower. Barki, Patry and 
Rivard (200 1) posit that the high risk outsourcing projects need close monitoring whereas the 
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low risk outsourcing projects does not need much control. So the success of the outsourcing 
project will be depending on the ability of the client to manage the risk which is associated to 
the nature of the outsourcing project. This study will try to answer the research question as 
stated below. 
Do the risk management practices moderate the relationship between the nature of the 
outsourcing project and the success of the project? 
1.5 Definition of Key Terms 
For the purpose of this study the following definition will be used when specific terms were 
referred. 
1.5.1 Risk 
Risk in the context of software outsourcing can be defined as possibility of loss or failure to 
achieve the desired outcome (Boehm, 1991) as agreed upon by the contract between the client 
and vendor. Aubert, Patry and Rivard (2005) in their research, defined the risk as a function of 
the probability of a negative outcome and the importance of the loss due to the occurrence of 
this undesirable outcome. Some of the undesirable outcomes are unexpected transition and 
management cost, switching cost, costly contractual amendments, disputes and litigation, 
service debasement, cost escalation, loss of organizational competency and hidden service 
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cost. Aron, Clemons and Reddi (2005) classified risk into four categories which are strategic 
risk, operational risk, long term risk of atrophy, and intrinsic risk of location. 
1.5.2 Risk Management Practices 
Risk management are referring to activities that includes identification and analysis of the risk 
to a software outsourcing project and then implementation and monitoring measures which is 
aimed to reduce the risk (Padayachee, 2002). Aubert, Patry and Rivard (2005) mentioned that 
risk management is referring to the use of special procedures to reduce the level of risk 
exposure. 
1.5.3 Software Outsourcing 
Software development is referring to the activities that are done during the software 
development life cycle which includes designing, coding, testing and maintenance of the 
software component. Software outsourcing represents the software development activities 
which are done by a third party vendor to fulfill the requirements from a client firm. Corbett 
et al. (2002) (as cited in Fairchild 2004) suggested that outsourcing concept are referring to 
contractual relationship between the client firm and the outside service provider for a task that 
is normally done in house. 
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1.5.4 Client Firm 
In the context of software outsourcing, the firm that is requesting software development 
services is referred to as client firm, whereas the firm providing the services is called vendor 
firm. The client firm will be engaged in a contract terms with the vendor firm who provide the 
required services or product. 
1.5.5 Nature of Software Outsourcing 
The nature of outsourcing is referring to the characteristics and environment of the elements 
related to the software outsourcing projects. The elements considered for this study are as 
below: 
Vendor Competency- technical skills, process capability and vendor experience in executing 
the software outsourcing projects (Aubert et al., 1999). 
Degree of Outsourcing - level of Information System being outsourced (Dibbern et al., 
2004). 
Contract Duration -the length of outsourcing contract given to a vendor (Lacity & 
Willcocks, 1998). 
Relationship -strategic partnership or buyer seller relationship between the vendor and client 
(Marcolin & McLellan, 1998). 
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1.5.6 Software Outsourcing Success 
The software outsourcing success is defined as satisfaction with benefits of outsourcing 
achieved by the client firm due to the result of deploying an outsourcing strategy (Grover, 
Cheon, & Teng, 1996). 
1.6 Significance of the Study 
The study is vital for the client firm to understand the importance of selecting the appropriate 
type of activities that can be outsourced. If the firm chooses high risk activities to be 
outsourced then it should follow up closely with the risk mitigation plan. If the risk 
management is not done properly then the firm may face the risk of not completing the 
outsourced task successfully. It may jeopardize the actual goal the firm trying to achieve via 
outsourcing arrangement. The cost and time line of the outsourced activities will be badly 
effected. So it is crucial for the client firm to decide on the type of activities that can be 
outsourced and perform risk management practices that is effective in mitigating and 
eliminating the risk (Barki, Rivard & Talbot, 2001). 
Besides that, the analysis of this study had been done at the micro level by looking at the 
managerial staff's perception on the role of the risk management practices. According to 
Dibbern, Goles, Hirschheim and Jayatilaka (2004), the domain of Information System (IS) 
outsourcing is maturing. Many researches are focusing at the macro level (firm and customer 
perspective) however there are very few researches focusing at micro level (individual or 
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group perspective). The researchers believe that expending the view up or down the scale 
would bring fresh insights to the body of knowledge in IS outsourcing field. 
1. 7 Organization of Remaining Chapters 
The theoretical foundation for the study will be presented in chapter two. This chapter lay out 
the literature review on software outsourcing and the risk management practices. The 
discussion on this chapter will be covering the independent variables: outsourcing vendor 
competency, the degree of outsourcing projects, outsourcing contract duration and the client-
vendor relationship. The dependent variable would be outsourcing project success. The risk 
management practices would be the moderating variable between the independent variable 
and the dependent variable. The research hypotheses will be introduced at the end of the 
chapter. 
Chapter three discussed the research methodology of the study. A survey questionnaire 
method was used to gather data regarding the independent, dependent and the moderating 
variables. Statistical techniques used in this study were briefly elaborated at the end of the 
chapter. Meanwhile chapter four focused on the results of the study. The demographic profile 
and outcome of the statistical analysis were presented in this chapter. Finally the discussion 
and conclusion of the study were shown in chapter five. 
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Chapter 2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 Introduction 
This section describes the review of prior literatures on the topics of software outsourcing and 
risk management. The theories supporting the risks behavior and strategies for the 
organization to mitigate the risks related to software outsourcing had been identified. The 
research hypotheses on the relationship between the variables were also established. 
2.2 Information System (IS) Outsourcing Phenomenon 
The Information Technology (IT) industry had been triggered by the Eastman Kodak's move 
to outsource its IS function to IBM in 1989. This is the first time such a major corporation had 
announce to outsource the IS department which was previously considered as a strategic asset 
(Dibbern, Goles, Hirschheim & Jayatilaka, 2004; Lee, Huynh, Kwok & Pi, 2003). Goo, 
Kishore, and Rao (2000) mentioned that since then the IS outsourcing phenomenon had 
evolved from traditional outsourcing services (data center, telecommunication infrastructure 
and desktop outsourcing) to a more specialized services such as Application Service Provider 
(ASP), business process outsourcing (BPO) and e-business hosting. 
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2.3 Types of Outsourcing Risk 
Aron, Clemons and Reddi (2005) suggested that the risk caused by outsourcing activity can be 
subdivided into few components of risk. There are strategic risks, operational risks, intrinsic 
risks of atrophy, intrinsic risks of location and transactional risk. The strategic risk is caused 
by the deliberate actions that the supplier may take as part of a profit-maximizing strategy. 
Examples of strategic risk are shirking, poaching or the misuse of information originally 
provided for a legitimate contract and opportunistic renegotiation. The researchers further 
define the operational risk as the risk of suboptimal output that caused by complexity of 
operations, geographic separation and the limitations of the communications channel between 
them. The intrinsic risks of atrophy happen when the client firm outsourced the entire 
activities to supplier. The firm may lose its core expertise that is capable of executing the 
activity in house. Finally the researchers explained that the intrinsic risks of location are 
caused by moving activities to remote locations. These risks are associated with different 
regions having its different sociopolitical systems and historical background. 
To gain an insight of the risk from the vendor's perspective, Taylor (2005) suggested that the 
risk to the vendor may arise from commercial environment, client, vendor firm itself, nature 
of software product, location and process. 
Risk is defined as the function of probability of undesired outcomes and the loss associated 
due to the undesired outcome (Boehm, 1991; Teece et al., 1994) (as cited in Aubert, Patry and 
Rivard 2005). Aubert et al. (2000) had done an extensive study on the possible undesirable 
outcomes that may happen in an outsourcing arrangement between the client and the vendor. 
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The researchers also had also identified the factors that are associated to the outcomes. The 
details of their findings are summarized in Table 2.1. The findings can help us to understand 
the reason behind the undesirable outcomes and take appropriate action to mitigate the risk. 
Table 2.1 
Components of IT outsourcing risk exposure 
Undesirable outcomes Factors leading to the outcome 
- Lack of experience and expertise of the client 
Unexpected transition and - with the activity (Earl, 1996; Lacity et al., 
management costs (Cross, 1995, Sappington, 1991) 
1995; Earl, 1996; Nelson et - Lack of experience of the client with 
al., 1996) outsourcing (Earl, 1996) 
- Uncertainty about the legal environment 
Switching costs (including - Asset specificity (Williamson, 1985) 
lock-in, repatriation, and - Small number of suppliers (Nam et al., 1996) 
transfer to another supplier) -Scope 
(O'Leary, 1990) - Interdependence of activities (Langlois & Robertson, 1992) 
-Uncertainty (Alchian & Demsetz, 1972; Barzel, 
Costly contractual 1982) 
amendments (Earl, 1996) - Technological discontinuity (Lacity et al., 1995) 
- Task complexity 
- Measurement problems (Alchian & Demsetz, 
1972; Barzel, 1982) 
Disputes and litigation -Lack of experience and expertise of the client 
(Aubert et al., 1999a; Lacity & and/or of the supplier with outsourcing contracts 
Hirschheim, 1993) (Earl, 1996; Lacity et al., 1995) 
-Uncertainty about the legal environment 
- Poor cultural fit 
- Interdependence of activities (Aubert et al., 
1997; Langlois & Robertson, 1992) 
- Lack of experience and expertise of the supplier 
Service debasement (Lacity with the activity (Earl, 1996) 
& Hirschheim, 1993) - Supplier size (Earl, 1996) 
- Supplier financial instability (Earl, 1996) 
- Measurement problems (Alchian & Demsetz, 
1972; Barzel, 1982) 
- Task complexity 
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Cost escalation (Lacity and -Lack of experience and expertise of the client 
Hirschheim, 1993; Lacity et with contract Management (Earl, 1996; Lacity et 
al., 1995) al., 1995) 
- Measurement problems (Alchian & Demsetz, 
1972; Barzel, 1982) 
-Lack of experience and expertise ofthe supplier 
with the activity (Earl, 1996) 
- Scope of the activities 
Loss of organizational - Proximity to the core competency (Prahalad & 
competency (Dom, 1989; Hamel, 1990) 
Earl, 1996; Lacity et al., 1995) - Interdependence of activities (Langlois & 
Robertson, 1992) 
- Complexity of the activities 
Hidden service costs (Lacity -Measurement problems (Alchian & Demsetz, 
& Hirschheim, 1993) 1972) 
-Uncertainty (Barzel, 1982) 
Source: adapted from Table 1 -Aubert et al. (2000) p. 3. 
2.4 Information System Risk Management 
Smith, McKeen and Staples (2001) found that the risk management will be helpful to the 
managers because it can pre-alert them on possible negative outcome prior to the actual event 
occurrence. The benefits of risk management are reducing additional effort spent correcting 
problems that could have been avoided earlier, helps to predict success and failure which 
occur without warning, and reduce the risk of decisions made without complete information 
or adequate knowledge of future consequences. The risk management process involves three 
steps: identification, assessment, and dealing with the risk. The researchers further conclude 
that risk management is considered as value added activity that turns the potential problems, 
opportunities, uncertainties, and hidden threats into risk mitigation actions plans which is 
transparent to management. It is a formal process where the risk can be brought to 
manageable level. 
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Aubert, Patry and Rivard (2005) suggested that the first step to evaluate the risk exposure for 
a given outsourcing contract should identifY the array of potential undesirable outcomes that 
could occur with respect to the outsourcing arrangement. Then the magnitude of the losses 
and probability of occurrence are to be determined. Under normal circumstances, a few 
undesirable outcomes may occur. The magnitude of loss due to a given undesirable outcome 
can be approximated either via quantitative analysis or via qualitative assessment of the 
organizational impact of each negative outcome. 
During the make or buy decision stage, the client need to analyze the type of task that is 
potential for outsourcing. If the task is critical application or strategic tool which will severely 
effect the operation of the firm, then it would consider to retain such application to itself and 
only outsource the application that is of lower risk to an outsource vendor. Wang, Lu and 
Zhang (2006) suggested that the selection of the vendor firm is very critical to manage the 
risk associated by the outsourcing contract. They propose a selection criteria based on the 
principle of vendor evaluation index system. This system will use five indices for evaluating 
vendor ability in terms of technology and production ability, management and business 
ability, reputation, financial operation ability, enterprise environment and understanding of 
pertinent laws and regulations. 
2.5 Underlying Theories 
The following section will explain the underlying theories related to IS outsourcing. Dibbern, 
Goles, Hirschheim and Jayatilaka (2004) conducted an extensive research on the literatures 
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regarding IS outsourcing. Their work on the underlying theories is summarized in Table 2.2. 
It provides a good foundation and wide coverage on the theories that can be applied to the 
topic of IS outsourcing. In the next section only a few important theories will be further 
discussed. 
Table 2.2 
Underlying theories on IS Outsourcing 
Tlteereiical Foundati811 Level of Allalysis Basic asslUIIptiDIIS MaiD Variahles/ Foc11S Key Authors 
Asymmetry ofinfonnation, Agent costs, optimal 
differences in perceptions of risk, contractual 
Agency Theory Organizational uncertainty relationships Jensen andMeckling(l976) 
Every player under the same Kreps et al. (1982); Nash 
conditions, make rational and (1953); Spence (1976); 
Organizational, intelligent decisions to maximize Decisions under certain Fudenberg & Tirole 
Game theory individual profit, incomplete infonnation situations 1990) 
Daft (1978) ; Rogers 
(1983); Schroeder et al. 
Individual, Innovation occurs in stages, some (198\1); Zalt.man et al. 
Innovation theories organizational models not based on stages Adoption, and diffusion 1973) 
Power, idiosyncratic interests, and Djfferent degrees of 
Power and Politics Individual, politics play majorroles in power, organizational Pfeffer, (1981; 1981) ; 
theories organizational organizational decision-making politics Markus (1983) 
Parties in the relationship assume 
that the outcome of a relationship Cooperation, 
Relationship is greater than achieved by interactions, social and Klepper (1995) ; Kern 
theories Organizational individual parties separately economic exchanges 1997) 
Barney(1991); Penrose 
A firm is a collection of resources, Internal resources, (1959); Pfeffer & 
andres ourc e s are central to a resources in the task Salancik, (1978); 
Resource theories Organizational firm's strategy environment Thompson, (1967) 
Exchange of activities, 
benefits/costs, 
Participation in exchange occurs reciprocity, balance, 
Social Exchange Individual, with the assumption of rewards cohesion, and power in Blau (1964) ; Emerson 
theory organizational and obligation to return rewards exchanges 1972); Homans (1961) 
Strategic Firms have long-tenn goals, and Strategic advantage, Chandler, (1961); Miles 
Management they plan and allocate resources strategies, choice of & Snow (1978); Porter 
theories Organizational to achieve these goals individuals 1985); Quinn, (198()) 
Coase (1937); 
Transaction Cost Trans action costs, Williamson(l975; 1981; 
theory Transaction I.imited rationality, opportunism fproduction costs 1985) 
Source: adapted from Table 3 -Dibbern et. al. (2004) p.l8. 
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2.5.1 Agency Theory 
The agency theory assumes an uncertain venture owned by a principal (client firm) and 
performed by an agent (vendor firm) whose actions are not fully observable to the principal. 
Lichtenstein (2004), in his research found out that outsourcing of software development 
environment fits this description well, as uncertainty is significant and performance is difficult 
to measure. The agency theory explained that the vendor who has unrestricted freedom due to 
incomplete information about their activity and invisible to the client tends to pose higher 
uncertainties to the client as they have less control over the vendor's activity (Keil, 2005). The 
researcher also posits that the vendor will show opportunistic behavior to maximize their 
profit instead of acting in the interest of the client. The opportunistic behavior can be 
classified as hidden characteristic, intention and action. Oh, Gallivan and Kim (2006) further 
explained that high costs is associated with the client monitoring the vendor's behavior, the 
vendor may be tempted to behave opportunistically due to moral hazard, adverse selection, 
and imperfect commitment. 
2.5.2 Game Theory 
The research by Oza (2006) shows that offshore outsourcing scenario matches the types of 
games identified in game theory. The offshore outsourcing can be classified as a nonzero-sum 
game if any gain achieved by client or vendor does not correspond with a loss of the other. 
Offshore outsourcing is also asymmetric in terms of different strategies identified for both 
clients and vendors. Oh, Gallivan and Kim (2006) posit that from the game theory 
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perspective, many vendors are tempted to behave opportunistic by shirking or failing to 
perform their best work when performance is difficult for the client to monitor. Oza (2006) 
also shows that the element of domination in the game happens to the client during the initial 
stage of the outsourcing relationship. However the power will shift to the vendor after a long 
term outsourcing work with a particular vendor when a renegotiation of the contract is done. 
If the vendor has the full access to the information, then the vendor will be powerful enough 
to dominate the renegotiation session. 
2.5.3 Resource Dependency Theory 
The resource dependency theory explained that the firm exchange resources to reduce 
uncertainty in order to remain competitive. One of the outsourcing objectives are to secure 
resources and capabilities that are not available internally. This specific reason shows the 
resource dependency between client and vendor. When the size of the outsourcing contract 
increases the client becomes more dependent on the vendor, they lose control over the 
resources to vendor. Further more this situation will lead to high switching costs, monitoring 
costs, increased resource dependency, and the risk of suboptimal vendor performance (Oh, 
Gallivan & Kim, 2006). 
2.5.4 Transactional Cost Economics 
The transactional cost economics theory explained that when a client firm outsourced a 
function that are highly asset specific, it will be exposed to greater transactional risk than 
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finns who outsource commodity type function. Due to the termination value of asset specific 
function is very low; the vendor is less concerned about the client's potential decision to 
tenninate the contract for nonperfonnance. The low tennination value may therefore 
encourage some vendors to behave opportunistically by maximizing their own self-interest at 
the client's expense (example: shirking, negligence, and suboptimal performance). When 
proprietary resources are managed by the vendor, even if the vendor does not meet its 
commitments, it is difficult and costly for the client finn to substitute with another vendor 
(Oh, Gallivan & Kim, 2006). This will create a lock-in situation for the client where the cost 
of finding a substitute vendor is higher than maintaining the current vendor. 
2.6 Theoretical Framework 
The theoretical framework was derived base on the agency theory and the transactional cost 
economics theory. Based on these theories the framework for the relationship between the 
natures of the outsourcing project (consist of factors such as vendor competency, degree of 
the outsourcing project, contract duration and relationship between the client and vendor) with 
the success of the software outsourcing project were derived. The risk management practices 
will be the moderating variable between the independent and dependent variables. 
The dependent variable is outsourcing success. It refers to achievability of the outsourcing 
goals such as cost efficiency and meeting the quality requirements. Outsourcing success is 
defined as "the satisfaction with benefits from outsourcing gained by an organization as a 
result of deploying an outsourcing strategy" (Grover, Cheon & Teng, 1996 p.95). Mahnke, 
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Overby and Yang (2003) p.23; Grover, Cheon and Teng (1996) summarized that the 
outsourcing success can be grouped into three categories which are strategic, economic and 
technological. Success in strategic category is referring to "the ability of the firm to focus on 
its core business and outsource the routine activities." Success in economics category is 
defined as "the ability of the firm to utilize expertise and economies of scale in human and 
technological resources of the vendor and manage its cost structure." Finally the success in 
technological category is described as ''the ability of the firm to gain access to leading-edge 
IT and avoid technological obsolescence that results from changes." 
Independent Variables Moderator Dependent Variable 
Risk management 
practices 
Vendor competency I 
Degree of 
Outsourcing success I outsourcing ., 
Contract duration 
I 
Relationship 
I 
Figure 2.1. Conceptual model of relationship between the independent variables, 
moderating variable and dependent variable. 
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2.6.1 Vendor competency 
The vendor competency is referring to the technical skills, process capability and the 
experience of the vendor in carrying out outsourcing project. Aubert et al. (1999) suggested 
that the vendor firm with high competency level and experience in outsourcing project will 
show high success rate for the completion of an outsourced project. DiRomualdo and 
Gurbaxani (1998) recommend that the client firm engaged in outsourcing activities need to 
ensure their vendor have the right mix of competencies and know- how knowledge. This will 
ensure that the vendor is able to deliver the services or products that meet the client firms' 
expectation and achieve success in the outsourcing project. Based on the literature, the vendor 
competency is an important factor for success of the outsourcing project 
Hypothesis 1 (Hl): There is a positive relationship between vendors with high 
competency and the success of the outsourcing project. 
2.6.2 Degree of outsourcing 
The degree of outsourcing is referring to level of IS component being outsourced. It will 
determine whether the project involves total outsourcing or partially or only a specific 
segment was outsourced. Dibbern et al. (2004) summarized that the degree of outsourcing is 
higher when the project needs to be outsourced requires extensive knowledge and specialized 
skill sets. It is assumed that the third party vendor had advantage in terms of superior 
knowledge and economies of scale. They were able to leverage specialized skills among a 
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broader range of customers. So the degree of outsourcing decision is higher if the required 
specialized skills are not available in-house. Grover eta!. (1996) mentioned that the degree of 
outsourcing will be positively related to the success of the project based on the resource 
dependence and transaction cost economics theory. 
Hypothesis 2 (H2): There is a positive relationship between degree of outsourcing and 
the success of the outsourcing project. 
2.6.3 Contract duration 
The contract duration is referring to the length of the outsourcing contract given to a vendor. 
A study by Lacity & Willcocks (1998); Ellman (2006), shows that short term contract have 
higher success factor compared to the long term contract. Based on Burstow (1994), there are 
few factors that influence for shorter contract duration. The first factor is value for money 
concern. The client firm is looking for a service that the vendor is able to fulfill in shorter 
period of time. Second factor is the flexibility for changes due to client firm business 
environment change. Shorter period of contract allow the client firm to have the flexibility to 
change over to another vendor. Third factor is regarding the vendor performance. Shorter 
contract duration will protect the client firm from the vendors with poor performance by 
limiting the contract duration. Fourth factor is regarding technological changes. The client 
firm is protected against the risk of locked up with vendor that is using the aging technology. 
With shorter duration contract the client firm can quickly change over to another vendor with 
latest technology. 
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Hypothesis 3 (H3): There is a negative relationship between contract duration and the 
success of the outsourcing project. 
2.6.4 Relationship 
Relationship between the vendor and client plays an important role in the success of 
outsourcing project. The relationship is referring to the strategic partnership or buyer seller 
relationship between the vendor and client. Marcolin & McLellan (1998) in their study posits 
that there was higher rate of outsourcing success for strategic partnership relationship. 
Nguyen, Babar and Verner (2006); Blumenberg, Beimbom, and Koenig (2008); Arshad, 
Mohamed, A., and Nor (2007) posit that trust and communication are the most important 
factor for success in relationship between client and vendor which will indirectly translate to 
success of outsourcing project. The relationship factor is considered as critical for the success 
of the outsourcing project (Surgent, 2006; Grover et al., 1996). 
Hypothesis 4 (H4): There is a positive relationship between the vender - client 
relationship and success of the outsourcing project. 
2.6.5 Risk management practices 
Risk management practices are referring to the actions taken by the client firm to mitigate, 
avoid or minimize the risk to the outsourcing project. A proper risk management will enable 
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the firm to reduce the effect of the risk when it occurs (MacCrimmon & Wehrung, 1986). 
Smith, McKeen and Staples (2001); Arshad, Lin, Mohamed and Affandi (2007), reveal that 
risk management will determine the success or failure of an outsourcing project and the risk 
management practices are on going process that needs to be integrated into outsourcing 
project management. Risk management practices using risk tracking tool such as Riskit 
method considered as effective way to manage risks on software development projects 
towards achieving its success (Freimut, Hartkopf, Kaiser, Kontio, and Kobitzsch, 2001 ). 
Hypothesis 1a (H1a): The relationship between vendors with high competency and the 
success of the outsourcing project will be stronger when risk 
management practices are high. 
Hypothesis 2a (H2a): The relationship between degree of outsourcing and the success 
of the outsourcing project will be stronger when risk 
management practices are high. 
Hypothesis 3a (H3a): The relationship between contract duration and the success of 
the outsourcing project will be stronger when risk management 
practices are high. 
Hypothesis 4a (H4a): The relationship between the vender - client relationship and the 
success of the outsourcing project will be stronger when risk 
management practices are high. 
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2.7 Summary 
The theoretical framework of this study was described in this chapter. The factors that lead to 
the success of a software outsourcing projects were identified and described. The factors were 
vendor competency, degree of outsourcing, contract duration and relationship. Then the 
hypothesis regarding the relationship between the variables were derived based on the 
literature. 
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